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 INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND AUDITORS’ MORAL REASONING:  
A CANADA-U.S.A COMPARISON  
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper compares the moral reasoning of 363 auditors from Canada and the 
United States.  We investigate whether national institutional context is associated with 
differences in auditors’ moral reasoning by examining three components of auditors’ moral 
decision process: (1) moral development, which describes cognitive moral capability, (2) 
prescriptive reasoning of how a realistic accounting dilemma ought to be resolved and, (3) 
deliberative reasoning of how a realistic accounting dilemma will be resolved. Not surprisingly, 
it appears that institutional factors are more likely to be associated with auditors’ deliberative 
reasoning than their prescriptive reasoning in both countries. Additionally, our findings suggest 
that the national institutional context found in the United States, which has a tougher regulatory 
and more litigious environment, appears to better encourage auditors to deliberate according to 
what they perceive is “the ideal” judgment as compared to the Canadian context. We then discuss 
the implications of these findings for regulators and for ethics research. 
 
Keywords: National Institutional Context, Moral Reasoning 
 
Data Availability: Contact the first or second author concerning data availability. 
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BACKGROUND 
In the U.S., the Senate, the Congress and the SEC are investigating the auditors of Enron, 
Andersen, and in particular Andersen’s admission that it shredded key files documenting the 
audit procedures followed. Under substantial public pressure in light of Andersen’s actions, 
Harvey Pitt, chairman of the SEC has recently announced plans to revise the requirements to 
which auditors in the U.S. must adhere (i.e., institutional context) (Byrnes, 2002; McFarland, 
2002). Although the prospect of increased regulatory intervention suggests a need to understand 
whether institutional context may have an effect, there does not yet appear to be evidence that 
institutional context may influence auditors’ moral reasoning.   
To that end, this paper compares auditors from Canada and the United States to 
investigate whether national institutional context may be associated with their moral reasoning
1
. 
National institutional context is defined in this paper as the combination of nationally based 
requirements, such as legal, regulatory and professional factors, that must be adhered to in a 
particular jurisdiction (Thorne and Bartholomew-Saunders, 2002). In organizational settings, 
prior research investigating institutional factors that influence individuals’ ethical conduct 
suggest the importance of situational variables arising from the immediate job context, 
organizational culture and characteristics of the work (Treviño, 1986). In particular, Ferrell and 
Gresham (1985) cite rewards and punishments as well as corporate policies as important 
determinants of ethical decision-making in organizations. As applied to the institutional context 
influencing auditors’ ethical conduct, rewards and punishments are assessed through the legal, 
regulatory and professional requirements for the regulation and licensing of auditors. 
While Canada and the United States have very similar cultures (Hofstede, 1981, 1990), 
auditors in each country face institutional contexts that are distinct along a number of several key 
dimensions. Several institutional variations between the U.S. and Canada suggest that the 
institutional environment influencing auditors from the two countries is quite diverse.  These 
                                                 
1
 Bay and Greenberg (2001), Jones (1991), Rest (1999), and Treviño (1986) identify the link between moral 
reasoning and moral behavior. 
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differences include:  1) distinct professional contexts with dissimilar emphases on principles 
versus rules between the two counties, as well as differences in the degree of self-regulation of 
the audit profession in the two countries (Brooks, 1997; Wingate, 1997); 2) diverse legal systems 
reflecting the judge-based nature of Canadian case law versus the jury-based nature of American 
statutory law, and 3) increased regulatory power in the U.S., with Canada not having a national 
regulatory body overseeing financial reporting as found in the Securities Exchange Commission 
(Needles, 1997).  
We use a broad-based random survey of 363 Canadian and American auditors to examine 
whether auditors’ moral reasoning varies with national institutional contexts. To develop a 
comprehensive understanding of the association between national institutional context and 
auditors’ moral reasoning, we use three different measures of moral reasoning: moral 
development, prescriptive reasoning, and deliberative reasoning.
2
 Moral development describes 
the most sophisticated moral reasoning of which an individual is capable. Prescriptive reasoning 
involves the consideration of what should ideally be done to resolve a realistic moral dilemma, 
while deliberative reasoning involves the formulation of an intention to act on a realistic moral 
dilemma (Thorne and Bartholomew-Saunders, 2002). The latter two are context-specific 
measures of auditors’ moral reasoning, which are needed to develop an understanding of how 
auditors actually consider moral dilemmas in the workplace (Arnold, 1997; Shaub, 1997; Thorne, 
2000). The use of a broad-based random survey mitigates potential firm-specific effects that may 
limit the generalization of findings of prior studies that rely on selective samples (Bernardi and 
Arnold, 1997; Jeffrey and Weatherholt, 1996).  
 
 
                                                 
2
 Thorne and Bartholomew-Saunders (2002) suggest that various aspects of moral reasoning are differentially 
influenced by external factors; therefore, a comprehensive understanding of the association between institutional 
context and public accountants’ moral reasoning requires an investigation relying on multiple measures of moral 
reasoning. 
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COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY 
Cognitive-developmentalists, generally, concentrate on studying the development of 
cognitive reasoning structures that precipitate a moral decision or choice. They believe cognitive 
moral capability becomes more sophisticated and complex as additional cognitive moral 
structures are acquired. At increasingly mature levels of moral development, individuals evolve 
from being primarily influenced by externally prescribed rewards and punishments to being 
primarily influenced by internally defined concerns for principles and universal fairness 
(Kohlberg, 1979). Kohlberg (1958) identifies three levels of moral development: pre-
conventional, conventional and post-conventional or principled. For pre-conventional 
individuals, the moral acceptability of alternative actions is defined by the rewards and 
punishments attached. For conventional individuals, moral acceptability of alternative actions is 
based upon an interpretation of the group norm. Post-conventional or principled individuals 
consider complex notions of universal fairness, despite legal, social, or material implications. 
Accounting researchers employing cognitive-developmental approaches mostly 
investigate factors associated with the moral development of auditors (Louwers et al., 1997). 
However, the focus of our paper is on auditors’ moral reasoning, which includes cognitive moral 
development as well as prescriptive and deliberative reasoning. Moral development is related to, 
but is distinct from prescriptive and deliberative reasoning (Rest, 1994). Moral development 
describes the most sophisticated cognitive moral structure an individual is capable of utilizing, 
and is not, theoretically, influenced by contextual factors (Rest, 1994). In contrast, prescriptive 
and deliberative reasoning describe the cognitive moral structure one individual applies to the 
resolution of a particular moral dilemma. According to Rest (1994), prescriptive reasoning 
involves considering what should ideally be done to resolve a particular moral dilemma, whereas 




National institutional context often is distinct from culture as a culture may span national 
boundaries (e.g., the gypsies of Eastern Europe) and there may be several cultures within one 
nation (e.g., in Canada there is a French-speaking and an English-speaking culture). While 
Arnold, Bernardi and Neidermeyer (1999) link inter-country differences in auditors’ moral 
reasoning to differences in ethical culture (c.f., Hofstede, 1980, 1991), institutional differences 
such as legal and regulatory structures, and professional rules and requirements may also play a 
role (c.f., Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Holloway et al., 1999). However, most of the evidence 
regarding the ethics of auditors is drawn from a single national institutional context, the United 
States (Louwers, Ponemon and Radtke, 1997). Thus, it is yet to be determined whether auditors’ 
moral reasoning is differentially associated with national institutional context.  
While Canada and the United States have very similar cultures (Hofstede, 1981, 1990), 
auditors in each country face institutional contexts that are distinct along a number of several key 
dimensions.
3
  First, through the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), the 
Canadian accounting profession has the authority to enact and implement financial reporting and 
auditing standards. By contrast, in the United States, accounting standards are set by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), an autonomous body whose actions are closely 
supervised and complemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission, an agency which 
mandate emanates from the U.S. Congress. This suggests that the Canadian accounting 
profession has more discretion than its’ U.S. counterparts in enacting and implementing 
accounting rules and standards.  
The events following Enron’s failure illustrate the difference in discretion between the 
Canadian and U.S. accounting professions and in their respective ability to control accounting 
                                                 
3
 As reflecting differences in the culture of auditors, Arnold, Bernardi and Neidermeyer (1999) find that there are 
significant differences between auditors’ responses to ethical dilemmas only on the two dimensions of individualism 
and power-distance.  These dimensions are similar between Canada and Americans with Canadians scoring 80 as 
compared to Americans scoring 91on individualism, and with Canadians scoring 39 as compared to Americans 
scoring 38 on power distance (Hofstede, 1991). 
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and auditing standards. On the one hand, through the CICA, the Canadian accounting profession 
was able to seize the initiative by creating an Auditing Oversight Board (AOB) that will review 
auditors’ work on a national basis. By virtue of its being a committee of the CICA, the AOB is 
not independent of the Canadian accounting profession, its corporate governance structure and 
funding comes directly from the CICA. On the other hand, the U.S. accounting profession saw 
the enactment of a new law by Congress that proposed the creation of a new Regulatory Board to 
oversee and regulate public accounting and auditing in the U.S.  The new Regulatory Board 
established by Sarbanes-Oxley is independent of Congress and of the American accounting 
profession, through the establishment of an autonomous corporate governance structure that 
requires independence in the appointment of those that sit on the Board (no more than 2 out of 5 
members can have been public accountants) and self-sufficiency in terms of financing. 
Second, Canadian accounting standards rely on a principles-based approach that is less 
detailed and emphasizes professional judgment and economic substance over legal form. In 
contrast, U.S. accounting standards tend to be more detailed and rule-oriented with extensive 
reliance on technical guidance and pronouncements serving as a substitute for professional 
judgment.   
Third, auditors face a different legal environment in Canada than in the United States 
(Brooks, 1997). While both countries rely on a common law framework, each country relies upon 
different sources for their common law development. The United States primarily relies upon 
statute to determine auditor liability whereas in Canada there is heavy reliance on precedent 
(earlier cases) and the courts will use case law of Canada as well as that of the United Kingdom.   
Moreover, the United States relies on juries to determine auditor liability (Kadous, 2000). This 
contrasts with Canada where audit liability cases are tried by judges. Finally, while class-action 
suits and contingent legal fees are an integral part of the U.S. legal system, they are rarely used in 
Canada due to structural impediments. Wingate (1997) reports that, in combination, these factors 
result in a different level of litigation between the two countries for auditors, with the respective 
 8




Fourth, securities laws’ enforcement differs extensively between both countries in two 
key respects. For instance, while the regulation of U.S. securities markets is under federal 
jurisdiction, Canadian securities markets operate under 13 provincial securities regulators. 
Moreover, in contrast to the S.E.C., the Ontario Securities Commission (Canada’s pre-eminent 
securities regulator) does not have the legal power to levy fines or to force the disgorgement of 
ill-gotten gains. Such legislation is yet to be introduced in Canada (Howlett, 2002). Hence, in 
Canada, professional accountants are likely less accountable for their actions to regulatory 
agencies.  
Our study examines whether the differences in institutional context between Canada and 
the United States is associated with a difference in the moral reasoning of auditors from the two 
countries
5
.  Previous research shows only one previous study that compared moral reasoning of 
Canadian and American auditors. Ponemon and Gabhart (1993) compare the moral development 
of 102 Canadian auditors to that of 133 American auditors employed in the same two “Big 6” 
audit firms. Figure 1 presents Ponemon and Gabhart’s results graphically.  
 
Figure 1 about here. 
 
As shown in Table 1, results in Ponemon and Gabhart (1993) indicate that, unlike the 
inverse U-shaped association between moral development and tenure often found in the 
American samples, tenure and moral development are positively associated in the sample 
comprising auditors from two Canadian audit firms. Because of the specialized and limited 
                                                 
4
 The level of litigiousness found in a country is suggested by the litigation index reported in Wingate (1997).  This 
index is based upon a risk rating developed by an international insurance underwriter for one of the Big 6 audit 
firms.  It takes on values based to reflect the legal risk faced by an auditor in a particular country. 
5
 Because there are several factors that as a whole constitute institutional context, it is difficult during a preliminary 
investigation to postulate a directional impact that the respective institutional contexts may have on the moral 
reasoning of auditors from the respective countries.   
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nature of the sample used in Ponemon and Gabhart’s (1993) study, it is unclear whether these 
findings capture organizational or national institutional differences in the moral reasoning of 
auditors (c.f., Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Jeffrey and Weatherholt, 1996). 
 
Table 1 about here. 
   
 Table 1 also shows that within a specific institutional context there is a difference 
between Canadian and American auditors with regard to how tenure and moral reasoning are 
related. However, it remains an open question whether institutional pressures (e.g., legal, 
regulatory, professional etc.) exerted in the two nations differentially influence the moral 
reasoning of members, once they enter the profession. This gives rise to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: The association between tenure and moral reasoning for auditors in Canada is 
different from that for auditors in the U.S. 
 
Ponemon and Gabhart (1993, 59) also find that the median level of moral development 
for Canadian auditors is higher than that of American auditors. This is consistent with other 
research suggesting differences in moral cognition of Canadian and American accountants. For 
example, evidence in Salter and Sharp (2001) suggests that Canadian and American accountants 
act differently in the presence of information asymmetry and incentive to shirk. Similarly, 
Etherington and Schulting (1995) report that Canadian Certified Management Accountants 
(CMAs) exhibit higher levels of moral development than American CMAs. Accordingly, the 
next hypothesis posits that the moral reasoning of Canadian auditors is significantly different 
from that of their American counterparts: 
 





Other Factors Impacting Auditors’ Moral Reasoning 
 Two other factors, previously shown to be associated with auditors’ moral reasoning, are 
included in the statistical analysis in this paper: gender (e.g., Gilligan 1982) and political 
orientation (e.g., Elmer, et al. 1983). With respect to gender, there is weak prior evidence of an 
association between gender and auditors’ moral reasoning. On the one hand, investigations of 
American auditors fail to find a significant difference in moral reasoning between genders (e.g., 
Armstrong, 1987; Ponemon, 1992; Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993). On the other hand, some studies 
find that female auditors have a higher level of moral reasoning than their male counterparts, both 
in Canada (Etherington and Schulting, 1995) and in the United States (e.g., Bernardi and Arnold, 
1997; Lampe and Finn, 1992; Shaub, 1994; Sweeney, 1995). To ensure that our results may not be 
attributed to differences in gender in the respective samples, we control for gender in our analysis. 
With respect to political orientation, some evidence suggests an association between 
moral reasoning and liberal political orientation (Elmer et al., 1983; Fisher and Sweeney, 1998; 
Markoulis, 1989; Rest et al., 1999; Sweeney and Fisher, 1998). This research considers whether 
moral reasoning may be associated or influenced by “an imbedded political ideological content in 
the instrument unrelated to the assessment of moral judgment” (Sweeney and Fisher, 1998, 139). 
Recent research in accounting finds that very little of the variance in accountants’ moral 
reasoning can be attributed to political orientation (Bailey et al, 2002; Bernardi et al., 2002). As 
the respective socio-economic infrastructures of the two countries are different, with Canadians 
being more “liberal” than Americans (Brooks, 1997; Di Norcia, 1997), we control for political 





Data was collected through a large-scale randomized survey of auditors in Canada and in 
the U.S.
6
 Subjects’ names and addresses were randomly selected from each country’s 
membership directory (i.e., CICA and AICPA), according to the year they obtained their 
professional certification. All participants have at least one year of audit experience.
7
 Participants 
received a survey that requested them to complete a three-item instrument to measure cognitive 
moral capability (i.e., moral development), a four-item instrument to measure audit-specific 
moral reasoning, and a questionnaire to gather demographic information. One-half of the subjects 
in the sample received the prescriptive form of the audit-specific instrument; the other half 
received the deliberative form. The questionnaire to gather demographic information included 
questions about age, gender, work experience, and political orientation. Several weeks later, a 
post card follow up was sent to all subjects. Participation was entirely voluntary and completely 
anonymous. Appendix 1 contains a sample of the survey.  
 
Measures of Moral Reasoning  
This research provides a comprehensive picture of the moral reasoning of auditors by 
considering each hypothesis, using three different measures: 1) moral development, 2) 
prescriptive reasoning, and 3) deliberative reasoning. Although related, moral development and 
moral reasoning are distinct constructs (Rest 1986). Moral development, or cognitive moral 
capability, describes the most sophisticated moral reasoning of which an individual is capable. 
Prescriptive reasoning involves the consideration of what ideally should be done to resolve a 
                                                 
6
 All survey questions were identical, however, the surveys differed in their reference to public accountants. In the 
survey distributed in Canada, we refer to public accountants as Chartered Accountants (CAs) whereas in the survey 
distributed in the United States, we refer to public accountants as Certified Public Accountants (CPAs). 
 
7
 Due to the difficulty of translating the research instrument into French, the Canadian sample only included public 
accountants with English as a first language. Further research is required to determine the similarities and differences 
between the moral reasoning of English- and French-speaking Canadian public accountants. 
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particular moral dilemma, while deliberative reasoning, involves the formulation of an intention 
to act on a particular moral dilemma.  
  
Cognitive Moral Capability or Moral Development  
 We use the traditional three-item version of Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT) to 
calculate auditors’ P-score, a measure of moral development or cognitive moral capability, as 
applied to the resolution of hypothetical moral dilemmas. Researchers interested in measuring 
accountants’ level of moral development often rely on the DIT, as do researchers in numerous 
studies outside the accounting domain (Rest et al., 1999). The P (for principled) score is the 
percentage of principled moral reasoning an individual uses to recommend how a hypothetical 
moral dilemma ought to be resolved. Davison and Robbins (1989) report that the P-score’s 
reliability varies between 70% and 90% for test-retest situations (within one-to-three week 
intervals) and for internal consistency (as measured by Cronbach’s (1951) alpha). 
 
Measures of Moral Reasoning as Applied to Realistic Dilemmas 
 How an individual makes a moral decision is influenced by situational factors and may 
change across domains and due to the intensity of the issue (Jones, 1991; Treviño, 1986). 
Because of their hypothetical nature, the dilemmas used in the DIT may not necessarily capture 
the moral reasoning used by auditors in the workplace (Massey, 1997). Thus, it is critical to use 
context-specific moral dilemmas to gain insights into a moral reasoning process that is 
representative of auditors (Shaub, 1997). As there are several facets of auditors’ moral reasoning 
that are relevant to their moral decision making, context-specific measures of moral reasoning 
may take several forms, including prescriptive reasoning and deliberative reasoning. 
Accordingly, to assess accountants’ prescriptive and deliberative moral reasoning in the 
workplace, this research relies on an audit-specific instrument that has been developed and tested 
by Thorne (2000). 
 13
 There are two versions of the audit-specific instrument: prescriptive and deliberative. 
Each version of the instrument is identical to the other except that each elicits one mode of the 
accountants’ moral reasoning. The prescriptive version of the audit-specific instrument requests 
subjects to consider how auditors should ideally resolve the described dilemmas. The deliberative 
version of the audit-specific instrument requests subjects to consider how auditors would 
realistically resolve the described dilemmas. Thorne (2000) validates each version of the 
instrument. According to Thorne, the reliability, and validity of the audit-specific instrument is 
comparable or better than that of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) of a similar length.  
 
Statistical Approach 
Tests of our two hypotheses rely on ANCOVA (Analysis of Covariance) to examine 
whether there is a significant difference in moral reasoning between groups. The independent and 
control variables in the ANCOVA include: country (1 for Canada, 2 for the U.S.); sector of 
employment (1 for currently employed in public practice; 2 for currently employed outside public 
practice); gender (1 for male; 2 for female); political orientation (1 for liberal; 2 for moderate 
liberal; 3 for moderate; 4 for moderate conservative; 5 for conservative); and an interaction term 
of work years by country. The interaction term is included to test for differences in the 
association between tenure and moral reasoning of auditors in each of the two countries.
8
 DIT P-
score is also used as a control variable in testing prescriptive and deliberative reasoning. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 434 auditors (215 CAs and 219 CPAs) responded to the survey. In Canada, we sent out 
1000 surveys; our response rate was 21.5%. In the U.S., the initial mailing of 1000 surveys resulted in 84 
responses (for a response rate of 8.4%). To increase our sample size, the survey was administered to 
                                                 
     
8
 Additional statistical analysis included all other interaction terms. They are not reported as there was no significant 
difference in the results as presented. 
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a second random sample of 1000 American public accountants. One hundred thirty five 
responses were received from the second mailing (response rate of 13.5%) for a total of 219 
responses from American public accountants (overall response rate of 11.0%). There were no 
significant differences in results from the two U.S. samples. Non-response bias was checked by 
statistical analysis and through telephone follow-up of a selected group. Power level 
computations also suggest that statistical inferences from t-tests and from correlations are 
relatively reliable (higher than 0.90) (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1984: 356-365). Among Canadian 
responses, eight could not be used due to missing data and twenty-five failed internal validity 
checks; so 182 valid responses were received. Nineteen American responses could not be used 
due to missing data and another nineteen could not be used because they failed internal validity 
checks, resulting in a total of 181 valid American responses. A comparison between responses 
from early and late responders does not reveal any significant difference between them in terms 
of moral development and moral reasoning. The demographic profile of the sample, in total, 
according to country and assignment of prescriptive or deliberative forms of the instrument, is 
presented in Table 2. The mean age of the sample is 43.6 years old, mean years of work 
experience is 18.6 and 21% of the sample is female. There are no significant differences for any 
descriptive characteristic listed in Table 2 for respondents broken-down by version of the 
instrument that they received (prescriptive versus deliberative). 
 




Before investigating whether national institutional context differentially associates with 
the moral reasoning of auditors in Canada and the U.S., we assess whether the associations 
between institutional context and moral reasoning reported in prior research extend to our 
sample. In particular, there is prior evidence of a significant association between tenure and 
 15
auditors’ moral reasoning, both in Canada (e.g., Etherington and Schulting, 1995; Gaa, 1994; 
Lemon, 1998; Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993; Thorne and Magnan, 2000) and the United States 
(e.g., Armstrong, 1987; Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Lampe and Finn, 1992; Ponemon, 1992; 
Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993; Shaub, 1994). Since previous research is generally based upon 
studies that generally rely on selective samples, typically based upon convenience, their findings 
may not be generalizable to the population of Canadian and American auditors and to the 
national institutional context of the respective countries (c.f., Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Jeffrey 
and Weatherholt, 1996). Accordingly, we examine whether there is a significant association 
between tenure and moral reasoning, and in particular tenure and moral development as found in 
previous research. Figure 2 shows the relationship between tenure and moral development for 
Canadian and American auditors in our study.  
Figure 2 about here. 
 
A comparison of Figure 2 to Figure 1 suggests that significant differences exist between 
the moral development of auditors included in our random survey and those in Ponemon and 
Gabhart’s (1993) study. Consequently, we statistically consider this association using three 
different measures of moral reasoning: moral development, prescriptive reasoning, and 
deliberative reasoning, as shown in Panels A, B, and C of Table 3, respectively.  
Table 3 about here. 
Consistent with prior findings (e.g., Armstrong, 1987; Lampe and Finn, 1992; 
Ponemon, 1992; Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993; Shaub, 1994), results in Panel A of Table 3 show 
a significant negative correlation between tenure and moral development for the combined 
sample (p ≤ 0.00), as well as for the Canadian (p ≤ 0.02) and American (p ≤ 0.03) sub-samples. 
 16
Interestingly, also shown on Table 3, we fail to find this association between tenure and 





Table 4 shows the results from ANCOVAs between auditors’ moral reasoning and their 
tenure, country, and current sector of employment, while controlling for gender and political 
orientation.
10
 There are three panels to Table 4, one for each measure of moral reasoning: Panel A 
shows the results of the ANCOVA for moral development, Panel B shows the results of the 
ANCOVA for prescriptive reasoning, and Panel C shows the results of the ANCOVA for 
deliberative reasoning. The results on Panel A of Table 4 show that moral development is 
significantly associated with work years (p ≤ 0.03) and political orientation (p ≤ 0.02). Panel B of 
Table 4 shows that prescriptive reasoning is significantly associated with gender (p ≤ 0.04). Panel 
C of Table 4 shows that deliberative reasoning is significantly associated with the DIT P-score (p 
≤ 0.01), and with work years (p ≤ 0.09), country (p ≤ 0.07) and country*workyear (p ≤ 0.09).  
Hypothesis 1 considers whether there is a difference between Canada and the U.S. with 
regard to the association between tenure and moral reasoning. Because of a lack of significant 
findings in Panels A and B of Table 4 for the interaction term, country*workyear, Hypothesis 1 is 
not supported for moral development or for prescriptive reasoning, respectively. However, as 
shown in Panel C of Table 4, the interaction term, country*workyear, is significant for 
deliberative reasoning. This finding suggests that there is a different association between tenure 
and deliberative moral reasoning in Canada than in the United States.  
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 Further, Table 3 also shows a marginally significant positive association between tenure and deliberative reasoning 
for the Canadian sub-sample (p ≤ 0.07). This result is in the opposite direction, and suggests Canadian public 
accountants’ deliberative moral reasoning increases with tenure.  
 
10
 Note that DIT P-score is included as an additional control variable in the ANCOVAs for Prescriptive Reasoning 




Table 4 about here. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 posits that the moral reasoning of Canadian auditors is different from their 
counterparts in the U.S. The lack of significance for the country variable in Panels A and B of 
Table 4 suggests that there is no difference between Canadian and American auditors’ moral 
development or prescriptive reasoning, respectively, thus providing no support for Hypothesis 2. 
However, as shown in Panel C of Table 4, the country variable is significant (p ≤ 0.07) for 
deliberative reasoning. Thus, there is limited and marginal support for Hypothesis 2, which 
suggests that there may be differences in the deliberative reasoning of auditors from Canada and 
the United States. 
 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
Given the ongoing investigations into Andersen concerning the Enron debacle and the 
increasing pressure to reform the institutional factors that affect auditors, it is becoming more 
important than ever to understand whether and to what extent national institutional context 
influences the moral reasoning of auditors. Toward that end, we analyze survey data that is drawn 
from a large random sample of 363 auditors from both Canada and the United States.  
 Several inferences can be made from the results of this study. The first is that national 
institutional context (e.g., legal environment, and professional regulation and licensing) appears 
to be associated with the moral reasoning of auditors. Consistent with broad-based studies 
conducted previously, auditors in our random sample exhibit a significant, and negative, 
correlation between moral development and tenure, in both Canada and the U.S. This suggests 
that changes in the national institutional context of both countries over the past decades has 
resulted in individuals with an increasing capacity for moral reasoning being attracted to the 
accounting profession (c.f., Thorne and Magnan, 2000). Thus, a key contribution of our study is 
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to identify the importance of institutional factors for affecting the moral development of 
individuals entering the profession. 
 Another contribution of our study is to identify to what extent national institutional 
context influences different components of auditors’ moral reasoning.  Similar to findings in the 
organizational literature that suggest the importance of penalties to ensure ethical compliance 
(e.g., Ferrell and Gresham, 1985), our results suggest that institutional factors are more likely to 
influence auditors’ deliberative reasoning than their prescriptive reasoning. For example, our 
findings suggest that the national institutional context found in the United States, which has an 
emphasis on penalties resulting from the tough legal and regulatory environment, appears to 
better encourage auditors to deliberate according to what they perceive is “the ideal” judgment 
than the national institutional context found in Canada. 
 The random selection of subjects for this study facilitates the development of a 
representative portrait of the moral reasoning of North American auditors, in terms of both 
similarities as well as differences between auditors from Canada and the United States. The use of 
a broad-based random sampling technique mitigates the effects of firm-specific differences 
(Bernardi and Arnold, 1997) and allows U.S. to compare whether there is a difference in moral 
reasoning associated with institutional contexts in two nations that are culturally very similar. By 
conducting a cross-national comparison of the moral reasoning of Canadian auditors to that of 
American auditors, we gain insight into the extent to which U.S.-based research findings are 
generalizable to the Canadian context. In addition, studying moral development, prescriptive 
moral reasoning, and deliberative moral reasoning, provides insights into which aspects of 
auditors’ moral reasoning may be most susceptible to national institutional context. 
 A few caveats are in order concerning our findings. The first concerns the use of self-
reported measures, the limitations of which are well documented. The second caveat concerns the 
nature of the sample. The use of anonymous, random, samples resulted in a lower number of 
responses than desired, particularly for the initial American sample. However, subsequent 
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sampling, testing for non-response bias, following up with phone calls to the survey participants, 
and comparing our findings to those of previous studies of the moral reasoning of U.S. auditors 
suggest our findings are representative. Finally, the caveats concerning the limitations of the 
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Figure 1. Moral Development (DIT P%) 




























Table 1: Practicing Public Accountants’ DIP P Score by Rank across the U.S. 





 U.S. DIT score 
 
Canada DIT score 
Partner (>6 years experience) 37.1 c 
35.6 a (Big 6)* 




Manager (>5 years experience) 41.9 b (national firm) 
 
41.9 d (Big 6)  
41.4 e (manager) 
41.1 3 (senior manager) 
38.7 a (Big 6)* 
38.5 c (manager) 
38.1 c (senior manager) 























FIRM AVERAGE 40.0 a* 44.2 a* 
Sources: 
a Ponemon and Gabhart (1993) 
b Ponemon (1992) 
c Shaub (1994) 
d Lampe and Finn (1992) 
e Bernardi and Arnold (1997) 
 
  
*Statistically significant difference between median DIT score of CPAs and CAs at the same 
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18.6               17.9             19.2 





17.9               17.5             18.3 





19.2               18.3             20.1 
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 43.6              42.9             44.4 





 43.3              42.9             43.8 





 43.9              43.0             44.8 
26-65            26-63          24-65  
 
Political Orientation 
 (1=liberal, 5=conservative) 
       -mean 








  3.5                3.4              3.5 







  3.4                 3.3               3.5 







  3.5                3.5               3.6 
 (0.1)             (0.1)            (0.1) 
 
 
Moral reasoning measures: 
Moral development  
• Mean 
• (Standard error) 
 
Moral Reasoning 
• Mean  






38.3             38.6             38.0 
 (0.8)            (1.2)            (1.1) 
 
 
 32.9             31.8             34.0 





40.1               41.4              38.8 
(1.1)              (1.6)              (1.5) 
 
 
 35.0              33.9              36.1 





36.5              35.8             37.1 
(1.2)             (1.8)             (1.5) 
 
 
 30.8              29.8             31.8 






  363             182               181 
 
 
  180                90                 90 
 
 







































































































*Note: Ten subjects failed to provide tenure information and were not included in this analysis. 
**Note: when results are in the predicted direction, p-values are one-tailed; otherwise, they are two-tailed. 
 




Panel A: ANCOVA for Moral Development 
Moral Development = ƒ(work years, country, gender,  political orientation)  
 
Source of Variation 
 
 
Sum of Squares 
 
 






Prob. > F 
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Panel B: ANCOVA for Prescriptive Reasoning 
Prescriptive Reasoning = ƒ(DIT P-score, work years, country, gender,  political orientation)  
 
Source of Variation 
 
 
Sum of Squares 
 
 






Prob. > F 
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Panel C:  ANCOVA for Deliberative Reasoning 
Deliberative Reasoning = ƒ(DIT P-score, work years, country, gender,  political orientation)  
 
Source of Variation 
 
 
Sum of Squares 
 
 






Prob. > F 
 
Within + Residual 
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     526   
































Table 4: ANCOVAs for Moral Reasoning  
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Appendix 1: Sample of The Survey Instrument  
 30
Here are an illustration case and sample questionnaire.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Simon Fellows is thinking about buying a house. He is married, in his early thirties, has 
two small children, and earns an average income.  No additions to his family are planned.  
His family has two cars and his wife works. Simon comes to you for advice as to whether he 
should or should not buy a house. 
 
Should Simon buy a house? (Check one)  X Yes __Can't decide  __No 
 
In the process of advising Simon whether or not he should buy the house, you may consider 
many different issues to be important. Below is a list of some of these issues. On the left-
hand side of each statement check the space which best corresponds to the importance you 
believe should be given to the particular consideration. (For instance, if you think that 
statement #1 should be of great importance in making a decision about buying a house, check 
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1.Whether Simon can afford a suitable house. (Note 
in this example, the person taking the 
questionnaire thought that Simon should place 
great weight on this consideration in reaching his 
decision). 
 
2.Whether the furnace on the house was thermal 
dynamic (Note that if a statement sounds like 
gibberish, nonsense or is not relevant to the 
question at hand, mark it of "no importance"). 
 
3.Whether Simon could still go on his annual golf 
vacation. 
 
4.Whether Simon’s wife wants to buy a house. 
From the list of considerations above, select the most important to the decision choice.  Put the 
number of the most important consideration on the blank beside "Most important.” Do likewise for your 
2nd, 3rd, and 4th most important choices. 
 
For example, from the list above, the four most important could be ranked as follows: 
 
 1 MOST IMPORTANT  4 SECOND MOST IMPORTANT   3 THIRD MOST IMPORTANT  2 FOURTH MOST IMPORTANT 
 
Note in this example, the top choices will come from those statements that were checked on the left-
hand side--statements #1 and #4 were thought to be very important. In deciding what is the most 
important, a person would reread #1 and #4 and then pick one of them as the most important, then put 
the other one as "second most important", and so on).  Statement #3 was of the next highest importance 
(some importance); therefore, #3 would be put beside the "third most important" choice. Finally, 
statement #2 was of the fourth highest importance; therefore, #2 would be put beside the "fourth most 
important" choice. 
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ALICE AND THE ABC COMPANY 
 
Alice is a senior auditor and a CA for a national CA firm that provides auditing, tax and consulting 
services.  The firm has developed a package called the ACME ACCOUNTING SYSTEM that is sold to the 
general public as well as the firm's clients. Alice is the auditor in charge of the fieldwork on the 
ABC Company, Inc. audit. During the course of this audit assignment, Alice is asked to evaluate the 
quality  control of the accounting system that happens to be the ACME package. Alice uncovers several 
severe control weaknesses in the ACME system.  Before rendering the management letter to ABC 
management, Alice is told by her boss to modify the negative comments regarding the ACME package. 
 
Ideally, should Alice amend the management letter? (Check one)  
 
 ___Should amend it ___Can't decide ___Should not amend it 
 
In the process of advising Alice whether or not she should amend the management letter, many items 
need to be considered. Below is a list of some of these items. Please indicate the importance of each 



















































































































































From the list above, rank the four items of 
 








1.Whether the weaknesses in the ACME system may be 
easily remedied by compensating controls. 
 
2.Wouldn’t a good employee defer to her superior’s 
judgment. 
 
3.Whether Alice’s job may be threatened by her 
refusal to revise the letter. 
 
4.Whether fair deliberation on the client’s 
financial position can predilect professional 
reputation. 
 
5.What is best for Alice’s firm? 
 
6.Whether or not Alice has a duty to ensure the 
management letter is accurate? 
 
7.What is the potential value of an independent 
audit in lieu of society’s current perspective on 
an enterprise’s net worth? 
 
8.How is society best served? 
 
9.Whether clients really care about internal 
control or if all they ever really want is a clean 
audit opinion. 
 
10.Would amending the management letter be 
consistent with what Alice thinks is right? 
 
11.What action would Alice’s peers in the audit 
firm expect her to make? 
 
12.What factors are relevant in determining 
Alice’s professional responsibility? 
 
 
greatest importance to an "ideal" response: 
  
___THIRD MOST IMPORTANT   ___FOURTH MOST IMPORTANT 
 
